We introduce the concept of poaching, the risk that in any transactional relationship information that is transferred between parties for purposes specified in the contract will deliberately be used by the receiving party, for purposes outside the contract, to its own economic benefit, and to the detriment of the party that provided the information. 
Introduction
We address the concept of poaching, the risk that in any contractual relationship, information that is transferred between parties for purposes specified in the contract will deliberately be used by the receiving party, for purposes outside the contract, to its own economic benefit, and to the detriment of the party that provided the information.
We argue that this form of transactional risk, a component of transactions costs, is increasingly important in our servicecentered, information-driven, post-industrial economy.
The increased use of contractors for business services such as consulting, systems development, or customer support and relationship management, has vastly increased the opportunities for poaching in recent years. For example, many information technology outsourcing projects involve a substantial exchange of proprietary business processes or product designs to enable vendors to design software to support these processes or products. Similarly, information technology-intensive third party service firms (e.g., call centers, data processors) often require substantial amounts of private customer data to accomplish their tasks in an efficient and effective manner. In both cases, these data may have substantial value if sold to interested third parties, possibly exceeding the value of the contract. Similar concerns also arise in manufacturing settings with the growth of offshore contract manufacturing facilities and an increasingly cooperative approach to research and development between buyers and suppliers. Problems with sourcing would not arise if incentives of clients and vendors in sourcing relationships were always in alignment; it is transparently obvious that this is not the case. Likewise, problems would not arise if any malfeasance by either party could be precluded in advance by a (long-term) contract that specified all acceptable and unacceptable activities, provided for certain and absolutely reliable monitoring, and were accompanied by certain and enforceable sanctions and penalties; a few moments reflection should be sufficient to assure that these conditions, likewise, are seldom observed. These concerns could be completely eliminated by vertical integration or by foregoing contracting altogether, although this is not an economically viable approach in most settings. Consequently, we find that concerns with the misuse of intellectual property transferred during sourcing relationships is of considerable economic significance. We offer just a couple of short examples here to suggest to the reader that this is of more than theoretical concern, and that it causes considerable expense.
-A software services firm in India tests software for clients who develop their code in the US. While some of this software is proprietary and of limited use outside the developing firm, some may have significant resale value if modified to fit the needs of other companies. The client firms invariably provide only object code to the testing firm, permitting only black box testing. While this does prevent resale, it adds greatly to the cost of testing, since black box testing has combinatorial complexity while sub-module testing can often be accomplished with linear complexity. The client's perceived risk of poaching by the vendor creates economic inefficiency.
-An American credit card issuer enjoys a considerable advantage relative to all of its competitors in assessing the expected future profitability of card holders. This information is used by proprietary retention specialists to set the interest rate charges for all customers, in order to maximize usage and the probability that the customer stays with the bank, thus maximizing expected earnings from each account. The bank divides support for retention specialists, with one firm doing data analysis, another working on software, and a third training specialists and operating call centers. Dividing activities up this way assures that no single firm truly understands the theory and data behind successful retention specialists, but it does increase coordination costs. Once again, the client's perceived risk of poaching creates economic inefficiency.
As intellectual property becomes more important to the competitive positioning of firms, and as outsourcing increases in importance, poaching will become an increasingly important source of inter-firm transactions risk.
Economic analysis of inter-firm relationships has primarily been based on one of three perspectives from organizational economics: transactions cost economics [5, 13, 19] , agency theory [1, 12] and incomplete contracts theory [8, 9] . These perspectives cover a wide range of possible contractual problems that arise from asymmetric information, bounded rationality, and irreversible investments. Information about vendor behaviors or external market conditions plays a large role in these theories, with the general perspective that more or better information will usually improve contractual performance. The benefits and problems of sharing market information such as demand estimates has drawn considerable attention in operations management (e.g., [7] ), economics [6] and finance. Similarly, there has been some attention to the benefits of sharing or transferring information assets used for production [3] . The R&D literature has also considered the problems in the transfer of intellectual assets, but this perspective either assumes that the information has enforceable property rights or that the potential for misappropriation is foreseen and explicitly considered in contracting among parties that value the asset (see [2] especially fn 3). Thus, while there is considerable research on several closely related issues, there is only limited research on misappropriation of information assets in contractual settings in the absence of enforceable property rights. 1 The paper is an analysis of how the increased use and sharing of information assets in a contractual exchange can lead to a set of risks different from those that have been previously considered in work in transactions cost economics, incomplete contracts theory or other theories of contracting and governance. This is emerging as an important issue in information systems (IS), as almost all systems development and IS outsourcing contracts create these risks, as do most contracts for information intensive services supported by IS (see our examples section for several variants). These risks are especially important for e-commerce businesses with limited resources or time to market considerations that require the use of outside service providers for many operational functions.
Previous Literature

Transactions Cost Economics and Principal Agent Theories
To date, the dominant approach to evaluating inter-firm contractual arrangements is the transactions cost economics (TCE) approach. TCE focuses on design of governance relations and the "failure" of markets in the sense that hazards of market transactions create lost opportunities for beneficial trade.
Mainstream work in TCE focuses on the tradeoff between reduced production costs and increased transactions costs of using market procurement. Earlier writers on the issue of transaction governance (such as [5] ) emphasized the role of frictional costs -the cost of locating suppliers, negotiating agreements and writing contractsas the impediment to contracting and a motivation for the existence of firms.
Williamson extended this to focus on "transaction risks," which arise due to bounded rationality and the potential for opportunism. These transaction risks are not borne directly, but are expected costs of adverse events that become possible (or likely) in specific contracting settings, or the costs of preventing these risks. Numerous costly mechanisms have been devised to protect parties in a contract, such as monitoring, performance measurement, bonding, or dual-sourcing.
At an extreme, the opportunism risks are so great that firms forego contracting altogether in favor of "uneconomic vertical integration" where firms forego benefits of the market due and instead own critical resources themselves.
The emphasis of transactions cost analysis has historically been in two areas: moral hazard (principally "shirking") and hold-up (also referred to as "opportunistic renegotiation" (see [4] ). Shirking represents a classic example of the principal-agent problem [1, 12] , where a principal seeks to hire an agent to perform a task. In cases where effort is costly to the agent and the outcome of the effort is difficult to measure, the agent will exert less effort than is optimal for the principal, thus increasing his or her own benefit at the expense of the principal. The usual remedies for this problem are monitoring to detect underperformance by the agent or incentive contracting where the principal and agent share the benefits of effort and thus have better aligned incentives. In some cases, when the principal cannot be satisfied that the agent will perform satisfactorily, or where the uncertainty of performance is so great that the agent cannot bear the risk of an incentive contract, the parties may fail to reach a contract altogether.
Hold-up represents a renegotiation of the terms of an agreement due to changes in bargaining power after a contract is signed.
In the economics literature, the emphasis has been placed on hold-up arising from switching costs, which principally arise due to relationship specific investment [1, 17, 19] and post contractual small-numbers bargaining [14] . Examples discussed in the literature include colocated facilities (site specificity), dedicated skills or training (human capital specificity), or unusual investments in specialized machinery or services for a particular customer (see a discussion in [17] , p. 21). In each case, one party makes an investment which is more valuable within an existing relationship than on the open market. The primary remedy for holdup is to establish the rules for future trade as clearly as possible, to build in mechanisms that adjust the contract to account for foreseeable but uncertain future conditions (e.g., commodities prices), and when this is not adequate, to forego contracting altogether. In actual contracts, these efforts to reduce hold-up appear as longer-term contracting, "escalator clauses" and other market-based repricing schemes, or shared investment in dedicated facilities. However, even with a well-designed contract, hold-up can still occur, as unforeseen changes in external conditions can result in unexpected shifts in bargaining power [1] .
Information and differences in information between parties are viewed as critical in transactions cost economics. However, nearly all transaction problems identified in TCE focus on problems of information asymmetry. For instance, most shirking problems can be attributed to imperfect measurement of effort or output. Williamson also identifies environmental uncertainty, bounded rationality and other forms of information asymmetry are the principal drivers of transaction risks [19, That is, withholding information, rather than sharing information, has been studied as the principal source of risk in inter-firm relationships.
Information "assets" in the form of procedures, work practices and training have also been considered a critical source of opportunism risk arising from holdup but in a way opposite to the problem we consider -it is the failure to invest in and create these assets that is the problem, not that these assets are too widely shared.
2.2.Incomplete Contracts and Property Rights Approaches
More recent and more specialized work by Grossman and Hart [8] , Hart and Moore [9] , and others led to the development of what is generally known as "incomplete contracts theory."
These analyses start with the assumption that contracts are incomplete and seek ways to structure the contract such that post-contractual bargaining yields efficient outcomes. The stylized incomplete contracts model is a setting in which one or both parties to a contract must make a non-contractible investment, which creates value for the entire relationship. Because each party must bear the total cost of their private investment, but only receives a share of the gains they create (simply because there is only 100% of the relationship value to divide among all parties), they will not provide socially optimal levels of effort. If, however, it is possible to set up an ex-post bargaining structure that allows each firm to capture its fair share of the gains after all investments are made, incentives to invest can be improved. These expost bargaining positions are generally established through the ownership of essential assets. The threat to remove these assets from the relationship creates the bargaining power and therefore enables the recapture of investment which in turn encourages investment.
Hart and Moore [9] focus more specifically on the welfare-maximizing ownership of different combinations of assets within a relationship. This work was also extended to information assets by Brynjolfsson [3] . In general, these theories predict that if an agent must make a non-contractible investment, or has essential information, then welfare is maximized when that agent also owns the complementary physical assets. Alternatively, essential information can be transferred to agents that must make noncontractible investments.
As we will later discuss, the remedies of broadening distribution of information or the transfer of needed physical assets tend to increase the risk of poachingthus, poaching considerations may alter or reverse these types of predictions about allocation of assets for maximal welfare. Moreover, the presumption in these models is that all agents can be engaged in bargaining over the value of information. In contrast, one of the critical reasons why poaching can be come a problem is that the value or alternative uses of information cannot be easily foreseen.
Overall, this synthesis of the literature suggests that an analysis of poaching will raise different concerns and suggest different remedies than are typically considered in the mainstream approaches on transactional governance.
A Theory of Poaching
Introduction
We define poaching 2 as involving three components: (1) The exchange of information between two parties, as a natural byproduct of contractual exchange for other goods or services, necessary for the performance of contractual obligation; (2) the subsequent use of this information by the receiving party, outside the purposes for which the information was provided, and for its own benefit or economic gain; and (3) at the expense of, or creating economic damage to, the party that provided the information.
For poaching to have substantive economic implications, all three components must be present. Information transfer (1) is clearly essential. Use of information outside the contractual boundaries (2) distinguishes this theory from nearly all other analyses of information sharing where the concern is the direct consequences of sharing between parties to a contract. Economic damage (3) to the contracting party is essential since information sharing absent economic damage is typically welfare improving. As mentioned in Section 2, the types of risks that arise are different than those considered by previous theories of contractual governance. It is these differences which we will highlight in the following sections.
Case Examples of Poaching
Poaching is a relevant concern in a wide variety of settings, including both manufacturing and services, and in a variety of activities that can be outsourced. The case examples below represent events and scenarios faced at actual firms, although in some cases the names are omitted for confidentiality:
Example 1 (dual sourcing):
A common practice in the semiconductor industry is a "dual sourcing" arrangement, where a company licenses technology to a competitor to enable them to produce competing products in return for a royalty. The goal of these arrangements is to allay customers' fears of hold-up by the principal manufacturer and ensure a stable supply of 2 Our review of the economics and management literature revealed only two current uses of the phrase "poaching". One refers to unlawful hunting of endangered species, the other to acquisition of staff from competitors. We therefore believe that our use of the term is new, distinct and unlikely to be confused with references in the prior literature. 
Example 2 (technology-based services):
Use of a third-party account administration firm naturally requires that an insurance company using this service provide all of their company records on individual accounts so that the account administrators can process and service accounts. The account administration firm now has the ability to mine the company data to identify the most profitable customers, which they can pass on as sales leads to competitors or resell to third-party marketing firms.
At a minimum, this could cause a loss of business. In addition, it could also cause substantial reputational damage to the insurance company could not be trusted to protect their private information.
Example 3 (software contracting):
A credit card firm engages a systems development consultant to build an extensive database system for correlating private product use information with publicly available customer data. The goal is to identify the predictors of profitable customers and to enable rapid design of new financial services products. After constructing the system, the systems consultant has considerable expertise in building data warehousing systems in credit cards and has fully tested source code for interfacing credit card databases with external data sources. They are now in a strong position to underbid their 3 competitors for work at other credit card firms by reusing expertise and possibly actual code from their previous engagement. They may have even factored in the value of learning and transferable expertise in their original bid for the job. More damaging to their original client, the consulting firm can pitch this work to competing credit card companies, and with the expertise acquired during their first implementation can enable these firms to successfully implement "copycat" technologies years before they otherwise would have been able to do so. This accelerated entry of competitors and their rapid deployment of similar technologies will shorten the period of advantage enjoyed by the original client firm.
Example 4 (business services):
Big Fish (BF), a large domestic travel agent seeking to compete with global firms such as American Express, needs to have expertise and presence in adjacent or related markets like Canada and the UK, and it needs them immediately. It lacks the both expertise in the market and access to preferred pricing or products necessary to be competitive. It forms an alliance with Little Fish (LF), a specialized player in one of these markets who provides this expertise, in return for access to BF's systems and network of global travel providers. After two or three years, when BF has local expertise, name recognition and relationships it needs, it opens its own offices in the same building as LF, and in direct competition with LF It is willing to honor the other terms of its agreement with LF, but that is of little help. BF has appropriated the expertise and exposure it gained through cooperation, and is now competing effectively with LF. With its survival at stake, LF then contacts a major competitor of Big Fish, and offers to transfer the expertise and software that it has received during its period of affiliation with BF, potentially undercutting some of BF's sources of competitive advantage.
Example 5 (consultants):
Here BF 4 engages a major strategic consulting house to help it develop a strategy and systems infrastructure for offering different prices to different consumers for travel services. In order to provide strategic consulting services, the firm must first learn a great deal about BF's business and the environment in which it operates, the various strategies that BF has considered, and the resources needed to implement them. Upon completion of the project, it then consults for and develops a price discrimination strategy companies in different aspects of the travel business, such as Marriott and USAirways, two companies that are not competitors but that are critical suppliers to BF. It then consults for and develops a price discrimination strategy for other firms that can utilize differential pricing such as CitiBank or Prudential Insurance, companies that are neither competitors nor suppliers.
Analysis of Examples of Poaching
In each of these cases we observe the essential ingredients for poaching: information transfer, opportunity for reuse of transferred information, and damage to the original contributor of the information. We also observe several of the factors that make poaching more likely:
Weak intellectual property protection.
Example 1 highlights the inability to "return" information at the end of a contractual relationship. The other examples highlight the difficulties created by limited or non-existing protection for expertise or business practices. Had suitable intellectual property protection been in place, there would have been legal remedies to reduce the potential for poaching.
(2) Existence of complementary assets. In all cases, the firm engaged in poaching has a well defined market of firms that had the complementary physical and information assets to exploit the information. In some cases (e.g., Example 1) the contract could only be written with a firm that already enjoyed or was able to build complementary facilities. In other cases, such resources were available in the market. Poaching is less of a threat absent these complementary assets. For example, the firm described in Example 3 breaks most projects down into multiple parts and assigns them to different systems development contractors. That reduces the possibility that a single contractor will have all the expertise required to reconstruct the entire system. (3) Limited observability: In many cases, even when remedies could exist, the actual poaching is difficult to observe. In the insurance example, it would be difficult to know whether the account administrator was reselling data with any certainty unless steps were taken to mitigate this specific risk.
(4) Bounded Rationality: Even in cases where the poaching is readily observable, it may not have been anticipated and therefore was not prohibited in the contract. For example, in Example 4 it may have been difficult for LittleFish to realize that BigFish would have all the necessary resources to enter into their market after such a short period of time. It might be difficult for the credit card company in Example 3 to anticipate all the potential uses for their target marketing technology.
In most cases, poaching is usually associated with greater social welfare as information reuse is not costly but can add increased value, provided that the poaching risk is not so great the firm foregoes contracting altogether. However, the distribution of value is complex. The firm providing the information is typically no better off, and indeed is usually worse off as a result of increased competition. There is no limit to this loss, so it can potentially be much larger than the anticipated benefits of contracting. Consumers and the firm(s) engaging in poaching are likely to be better off. However, this transfer is not a zero sum game. In some cases, the gain of the second firm can exceed the loss incurred by the information provider enabling a potential welfare increasing agreement to be reached (if it is possible to bargain over these gains -anti-trust or other considerations may limit this choice). However, when the gains to the second party are insufficient (for instance, most of the value accrues to consumers), such an arrangement cannot be reached and poaching becomes a risk. In this setting, the information provider will typically want to invest in preventing poaching, although these investments are socially wasteful.
Comparison of Poaching to TCE Analysis
In distinguishing the differences that a theory of poaching implies for contractual design and post contractual conduct, it is useful to compare the predictions of traditional transactions cost economics approaches to the predictions yielded by our theory of poaching. In almost every example, transactions cost or contract theory analyses of these cases would highlight different concerns and identify different remediation strategies, some of which can be detrimental.
In Example 1, transactions cost analysis would highlight the potential for hold-up as one party, The principal risk to Intel would be hold-up from having made a commitment to a single alternative source during the duration of the relationship. The traditional TCE remedy would be to have the primary supplier contract with several vendors, yet from the perspective of poaching this may be the worst possible remedy. The likelihood of poaching increases at least linearly with the number of independent suppliers, with a combination of more potential poaching firms and an increased difficulty to identify losses resulting from poaching to a specific supplier when the supplier base is large.
In the second example, a primary concern raised by TCE analysis would be the hold-up of the client, since switching third party administrators would require substantial time and cost to the insurance company. However, perhaps more severe is the risk of shirking in the customer service function, which could cause customer attrition at the insurance company and reduce profitability.
Given that customer service outcomes could be monitored through satisfaction surveys, measured complaint and error rates, or inspection of actual customer service events, there is an opportunity for incentive contracting. However, if incentive contracting also comes with a commitment to full information sharing between the client and vendor on product problems, customer service concerns or other proprietary data, then this can increase the scope of poaching. Thus, these contractual remedies, at best, do nothing to reduce poaching and at worst, may actually increase it.
In the third and fifth examples (software development outsourcing), there is often a substantial gains from trade resulting from using a specialized development house for software production. A traditional TCE analysis would suggest that the principal risk to the client comes from vendor shirking due to uncertainty about product characteristics and imperfect monitoring. Secondarily, to the extent that the client becomes dependent upon the vendor for maintenance or delivery, holdup by the vendor becomes a real possibility as well. The typical solution to this problem is to work closely with the vendor transferring expertise and assuring quality of the delivered product. However, this also ensures that the resulting product is of sufficient quality to permit resale and thus may actually have the unintended effect of facilitating poaching.
Interestingly, like much of the literature on the "make vs. buy" decision, research on IT contracting has placed substantial emphasis on the tradeoff between cost savings and vendor shirking as the explanation for uneconomic vertical integration. An analysis of poaching, however, would suggest that a more serious concern should be misuse of information. In addition, this sort of analysis of poaching is different than the usual remedy of "not outsourcing strategic systems" (see e.g. [15] ) or never outsourcing "core competencies" [16] , since it does not rely on definitions of "core" or "strategic", but identifies an issue that is present whenever transferred information has value from reuse or resale.
An incomplete contracts analysis of the Big Fish-Little Fish example would observe that LF has significantly less bargaining power than BF since there are many local firms similar to LF, but only a few global travel firms comparable to BF. Thus, LF is potentially vulnerable to hold up, and may be less likely to make noncontractual investments necessary to ensure the value of the relationship. Classical approaches to resolve these problems might, if profits from the association could be measured, result in some form of long term incentive contract. If monitoring were not sufficiently effective, some form of asset transfer to LF might be appropriate to help balance long term bargaining power. However, incentive contracting will do little to prevent poaching, and asset transfers to prevent shirking usually increases the danger of poaching.
Remedies for Poaching
Traditional Approaches
There are a wide variety of contractual remedies for addressing various types of information or incentive problems that have been identified by other contracting theories. In this section, we systematically examine the efficacy of these approaches for limiting poaching, as well as any negative consequences that could arise when these approaches are employed without considering the potential for poaching.
Incentive Contracting and Monitoring
The classic solution to incentive problems is to utilize incentive contracts.
Because output measures are imperfect, incentive contracts create costly risk for the agent which can be offset by additional expenditure on monitoring. This is the classic tradeoff between incentives, Incentive contracting is only weakly applicable to preventing poaching because poaching is difficult to observe. To the extent that poaching does affect high-level performance measures of the client or vendor, paying based on profitability or other high-level performance measures may help somewhat. However, this is likely to be a very weak incentive when compared to the much larger gains or damage created by poaching. Investments in monitoring of poaching activity are a reasonable remedy, although limited by the degree of observability of poaching. Information misuse can often only be observed by the capabilities it provides, making it difficult to establish with certainty a direct link between a market outcome and the misappropriation of information. To resolve this uncertainty it may require extensive access to private information on activities and business processes of the firm engaging in poaching, which may be costly and difficult to obtain. Thus, monitoring may be a relatively costly or limited remedy, although extreme circumstances will justify its use.
There is some risk of incentive contracts exacerbating poaching. The primary difficulty is that incentive contracting is often coupled with increased information sharing. For example, for a sales agent to be effective and to direct customers to high profit products to maximize their compensation under a profit-based incentive scheme, the sales agent will need to know a great deal about the relative profitability of different products. This information may have substantial value to the agent (and create substantial losses to the employer) should the agent begin to work for a competitor.
Finally, it should be noted that incentive contracts can often reward the antecedents to poaching. For instance, a contract manufacturer in a quality sensitive industry, anticipating a poaching opportunity, may make unusually large non-contractible investments in product quality. This will enable them to capture value from their incentive contract on quality but it will also increase the value of their outside opportunity.
Transfer of Asset Ownership
Asset ownership creates bargaining power and therefore encourages non-contractible investment in the usual incomplete contracts logic. However, broadening the ownership of assets will typically increase poaching risk in several ways: 1) transferring information creates a basis for poaching, 2) transferring complementary assets may provide the necessary capabilities to reuse other information (e.g., a design is only useful if production capability exists), and 3) assets often embed information which can be misappropriated (for instance, transferring a machine that produces a unique product may provide information on the design or the formula for the product itself). Generally, it is optimal to limit a partner's ownership of complementary assets as much as possible if poaching is a concern, and thus transferring assets has, once again, precisely the wrong effect on the risk of poaching.
Restricted Activities
A key component of contracts are restrictions on certain activities.
This can both eliminate unwanted activities or increase incentives for permitted activities in multi-task settings [11] . While the idea of exclusion restrictions for incentive purposes seems to have little relationship to poaching, the general idea of restricting activities is quite important. Many types of contractual mechanisms such as nondisclosure agreements, non-competition clauses and limitations of future trade partners can be effective in limiting poaching if the appropriate set of restrictions can be identified at the time of contracting. These restrictions have several limitations. First, it may difficult to identify or monitor activities to be restricted -it is the uncertainty of the outside opportunity that creates the potential for poaching. Second, these restrictions create opportunity costs for the vendor which reduce value..
Bonding
Firms may agree to post a bond to demonstrate willingness or ability to satisfy terms of an agreement. Bonding has two values: first, it guarantees that some resources will be available to compensate the aggrieved party in the case of contractual non-performance, and second, it often introduces a third-party arbitrator to oversee whether the terms of the agreement were met. In general, to the extent that poaching is observable and verifiable by a third party, bonding can be effective. Similarly, there are no potential negative consequences caused by using bonding to solve other contractual problems, provided the bonding process does not require additional information to be shared. 
Reputation
Reputation is a form of bonding, where the bond itself is implicit. A firm builds up a reputation over time for engaging in appropriate conduct. This foregone opportunism has a cost to the firm, which forms the economic value of their bond. As with bonding, poaching can only be prevented by reputation if it can be detected and credibly communicated to the market.
Relational Contracting
Relational contracting is the use of loosely defined contractual agreements that set the rules for future negotiations and is especially effective if relationship value is large compared to short term gains of misbehavior.
Relational contracting is usually associated with high degrees of information sharing, potentially increasing poaching risk. However, because of the embedded ongoing process of renegotiation, it is much more likely that reuse of information is negotiated rather than obscured. However, the benefits of reduced poaching can only be realized if poaching can be anticipated or observed.
Auctions and Competitive Bidding
It is common for contracts to be allocated by auctions or competitive bidding, especially when vendor capabilities (e.g., cost) are unknown. Competitive bidding structures are likely to be very problematic in situations where poaching is possible because the low-bidding vendors may be those who have the greatest outside opportunity for poaching, or who have priced their bids based upon the value that can be obtained through poaching. Perhaps even worse, "honest" firms that underestimate their true costs may win a contract that they cannot complete at a profit and may seek alternative ways (including poaching) to improve their profitability. Thus, like other types of unobservable vendor differences, poaching risk can be exacerbated by competitive bidding.
Risk Reduction Approaches
There is no standardized list of approaches for solving poaching problems. Several common approaches described above that offer some relief were bonding, monitoring, exclusion of activities (e.g., non-competition agreements), reputation, and relational contracting.
In addition, we have identified some other approaches that have proven useful in the past.
Embed information in systems. Information can be partially withheld by embedding it in software or systems. The vendor may have full access to the capabilities of the information but not the information itself.
Encryption/Separation of Models and Data.
Confidential and critical data can be encrypted or kept separate from the information that is necessary to reveal to the vendor to perform a service or build a product.
Modularity.
An approach that has been effectively by many companies has been to separate critical components of the product from the rest. For instance, the Coca-Cola produces all their own syrup for soft drinks, but contracts for bottling to outside firms. As long as the product cannot be easily reverse engineered and is never disclosed by the company (qualifying it for trade secret protection) this can be effective. A variant of this approach is to distribute different components to different suppliers so that no single supplier has all the parts needed to replicate the product.
Seeding. For large bodies of information that are likely to have resale value, "dummy" information could be included that may help reveal the presence of poaching. Mailing list vendors and map makers have used this strategy for many years.
Conclusion
Overall, our primary conclusion is that poaching is a distinct contractual risk that it is of increasing importance. Moreover, we conclude that it is, at best, not well addressed by classical contracting mechanisms, and at worst exacerbated by remedies for various contractual problems suggested by TCE, Principal-Agent or Incomplete Contracts theory. While we are able to identify a number of mechanisms that might perform better, the optimal contract structure when poaching is a potential difficulty is a promising area of future research from both a theoretical and practical standpoint. 5 We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and seminar participants at the Workshop on Information Systems and Economics for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This research was supported by the Jones Center Project on Information, Industry Structure and Competitive Strategy and NSF Grant IIS-9733877.
